GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2013

Who's the Father?
Naomi R. Cahn
George Washington University Law School, ncahn@law.gwu.edu

June Carbone

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Who's the Father?, 93 B.U. L. Rev. Annex 55-58 (2013).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

WHO’S THE FATHER?
NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE∗

When couples manage to be close enough to conceive a child, but not close
enough to determine the child’s future, who gets to decide when they disagree:
mother, father, state courts, or a tribe? The litigation that produced the
Supreme Court decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl1 demonstrates why
we are no closer to a definitive resolution of what to do when parents do not
share assumptions about how to raise their child.
Dusten Brown and Christy Maldonado, the biological parents in the case,
had known each other since high school and were engaged to be married when
Maldonado found out she was pregnant.2 Brown, then serving in the U.S.
Army,3 did what many would consider to be the “right thing”: he proposed
moving up the wedding date.4 According to Maldonado, he also told her he
would not provide support unless they were married.5 Maldonado was
offended.6 She thought that it was wrong to marry for money or to condition
support on marriage7 and broke off the engagement. When she subsequently
texted Brown to ask whether he wanted to pay support or give up his parental
rights, he opted for the latter.8 It did not help that he was stationed four hours
away, preparing to deploy to Iraq, and rarely communicated with Maldonado
face to face.9
Maldonado, who had two children from an earlier relationship, decided to
place the child, now known as “Baby Veronica,” for adoption with a couple in
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1 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
2 Id. at 2558; Allyson Bird, Birth Mom Explains Adoption Decision, POST & COURIER,
Mar. 23, 2012, http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20120104/PC1602/301049905.
3 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 4, Adoptive
Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), available at http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/
3mer/1ami/2012-0399.mer.ami.pdf.
4 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
5 Bird, supra note 2.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
9 See Bird, supra note 2.

55

56

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:55

whom she had confidence.10 Brown, who showed no interest in the child until
he received the adoption papers almost four months after Baby Veronica’s
birth, then sought custody.11 He explained that his earlier agreement to
terminate his rights was based on his belief that the mother would be raising
the child herself.12 But his reasoning did not really matter because, as it turns
out, he had no rights to consent to the adoption under state law, much less to
seek custody.13 Brown had not lived with Maldonado or Baby Veronica or held
out Baby Veronica as his own, nor had he provided support to Maldonado
during her pregnancy; his offer to marry her and then support her was
irrelevant.14
Strip out the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) from Adoptive Couple, and
these facts illustrate the national lack of agreement on what makes someone a
parent. South Carolina, like many other states, sets limits on when nonmarital
biological progenitors are given rights.15 Moreover, in charmingly antiquated
language, South Carolina law provides that “the custody of an illegitimate
child is solely in the natural mother.”16 Even if the adoption had been brought
in Oklahoma, where Baby Veronica was born, Brown’s choice to condition
financial support upon marriage would still have precluded him from any right
to consent to the adoption.17 States like Missouri, on the other hand, go to
greater lengths to recognize parental rights on the basis of biology.18 The
ICWA, which seeks to promote tribal interests through greater recognition of
biologically based rights,19 differs less from many state laws today than it did
at the time it was passed.
At the core of these differences is the question of how to align parental
behavior with the promotion of the child’s interest in stable and secure
10

Id.
Id.
12 Id.
13 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505-4.2(C) (2011) (listing as an exception to the parental
consent requirement for adoption the father of a child born out of wedlock, when the child is
placed for adoption within fourteen months of birth and the father has not exercised his
parental rights, including financially supporting the child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9310(A)(5) (2008) (requiring the father to have “openly lived with the child or the child’s
mother” for six months before the placement and that he “openly held himself out to be the
father” or that he “paid a fair and reasonable sum, based on the father’s financial ability, for
the support of the child or for expenses incurred in connection with the mother’s
pregnancy”).
14 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505-4.2(C); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(5).
15 S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(5).
16 Id. § 63-17-20(B).
17 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505-4.2(C).
18 MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.030 (West 2002) (granting a consent right to any man who is
presumed to be the father or who is willing to establish paternity).
19 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (2012) (defining parent as “any biological parent,” including unwed
fathers so long paternity has been acknowledged or established).
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relationships. It is hard to see the impact of this interest in the Adoptive Couple
litigation, as a twenty-seven-month-old Baby Veronica was transferred from
the adoptive couple who raised her to a father she had never met,20 then
abruptly ordered returned to that couple after the conclusion of the case.21
Historically, parenthood has been linked with marriage in order to promote
greater stability. A father who did not marry the mother received no legal
recognition, even if he lived with and supported her.22 Professors Kathryn
Edin, Ronald Mincy, and Laura Tach described parenthood as a “package
deal” for men that linked legal recognition and assumption of the parental role
to a man’s relationship with the mother.23
Today, fathers and mothers may assume parallel parental roles without any
prerequisite relationship with each other.24 The result makes the forging of
shared understandings, the coordination of parental conduct, and the resolution
of legal rights and responsibilities dramatically more difficult. Earlier
fatherhood cases involved men who either had or wanted a continuing
relationship with the mother as well as the child.25 Kathryn Edin and Timothy
Nelson’s new book26 illustrates a somewhat different model of father-child
relationships. The low-income fathers they study often do not know the mother
very well when she becomes pregnant, and the relationship frequently does not
survive the birth. Yet the men are thrilled to be fathers, adore the child, and
seek ongoing contact regardless of the status of their relationship with the
mother.27 Edin and Nelson highlight, however, that “[i]n a startling reversal of
the way gender typically operates in American society, unwed childbearing
seems to offer mom, and not dad, all the power: ‘it’s her way or the highway,’
in the words of one father.”28
20

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2559 (2013).
“Baby Veronica” Handed over to Adoptive Parents, Cherokee Nation Confirms, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013, 1:04 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57604299/babyveronica-handed-over-to-adoptive-parents-cherokee-nation-confirms.
22 June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New Model of
Parental Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1999).
23 Laura Tach et al., Parenting as a Package Deal: Relationships, Fertility, and
Nonresident Father Involvement Among Unmarried Parents, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 181, 181-84
(2010).
24 Carbone, supra note 22, at 1094; see JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE
MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at ch. 10); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
25 See Carbone, supra note 22, at 1149 (finding that in the majority of high-profile
fathers’ rights cases, the father sought a relationship only after the mother rebuffed his
efforts to reestablish a relationship with her).
26 KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE
INNER CITY (2013).
27 Id. at 17.
28 Id. at 214.
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Fathers cannot look to the law for more consistent treatment or
encouragement. In most jurisdictions, fathers will be liable for child support on
the basis of biology alone, whether or not the mother facilitates their access to
the child.29 In determining custodial rights and in granting the ability to object
to adoption, states vary enormously. Some identify the child’s interests in
contact with the father solely on the basis of the biological tie,30 while others,
like South Carolina, give uninvolved fathers no rights at all, regardless of the
biological tie.31 Moreover, even in the jurisdictions that make it easier for
fathers to seek custodial rights, the men still need to establish paternity, which
can be expensive and time consuming without the mother’s cooperation, and
hire an attorney if necessary to enforce a subsequent custodial order.32
Adoptive Couple differs from the more typical case primarily in the support
the tribe offered Brown to realize his rights as a parent.33 The ICWA, however,
does nothing (and should not be expected to do much) to answer the larger
question: When does a biological father have an obligation to assume a
parental role, and under what circumstances does the legal mother have an
obligation to accept him when he does?
These questions, rather than the ICWA debates, frame children’s interests.
In the last ICWA case to reach the Supreme Court, the tribal court that won
jurisdiction over the Indian child’s determination of custody put the child’s
interest first in the subsequent litigation.34 In contrast, the South Carolina
courts, both in initially transferring custody to the father and then changing it
back to the adoptive parents, have treated Baby Veronica as no more than a
pawn. It is time to recognize that a parent who is nowhere to be found at the
time a child establishes critical emotional ties cannot later undo the
determination of legal parenthood, and at the same time, courts must recognize
that biological fathers and mothers may be confused about what, precisely, is
the right thing to do to help them protect their rights.

29

Id.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.030 (West 2002).
31 S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(5) (2008).
32 See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 26, at 214.
33 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 555 (S.C. 2012).
34 Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 17-18 (2008) (describing the
holding of Choctaw Tribal Court Judge Roy Jim as “balanc[ing] the Tribes’ interest in
keeping tribal children in tribal communities against the children’s interests in continuity
and stability” with the latter ultimately proving to be more important in the ruling).
30

